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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
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}
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WILMA WHITE, OTIS DIBLER, DOROTHY}
MAE DIBLER, GRACE DAVIS, and
}
MARLOWE C. SMITH,
}

CASE NO. 16032

}

Defendants-Respondents.}
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

* * * * * * *
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District Court for Salt Lake County
Hon. Dean E. Conder, Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JIMCO LTD. , HUMECA EXPLORATION
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER, ELDON
J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, JEAN L.
CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER, N. J.
WHITE, AUDREY WHITE, WILMA WHITE,
OTIS DIBLER, DOROTHY MAE DIBLER,
GRACE DAVIS, and MARLOWE C.
SMITH,

CASE NO. 16032

Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * *
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

* * * * * * *
Appellant ("Rio") hereby files its reply brief in response
to the briefs filed by "Respondent Audrey Defendants" and "Jimco
Defendant-Respondents".
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
In Rio's opening brief and in the responsive briefs of both
the Jimco and the Audrey Respondents, it is conceded that the
following provisions of the Amended Audrey Lease governed the
relationships between Rio-Audrey (as co-owner lessors) and Rio
(as lessee) at all pertinent times until the court below approved
the terms of the so-called "Settlement Agreement":
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3.2
Irrespective of the provisions set forth in
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have the
election and option to have royalties due
them under the terms of this Lease calculated
and paid upon the basis of eight ~ercent (8%)
of the fair market value at the m1ne portal
of crude ore m1ned and produced from the
Audrey Group ... [Emphasis added]
21.3
Rio Algom Corporation shall, by reason of its
interest in this Lease as described in Section
II hereof, be excluded from ~ vote or
decision of the Lessors relat1ng to royalties
and requiring unanimity of the Lessors, as
provided for in Section 3.2 hereof. The
unanimous vote or decision of the remaining
Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation
shall constitute unanimity for the purpose of
the said Section 3.2.
The parties, however, part company on the interpretation of
this language.

Rio claims that through paragraph 21.3, it excluded

itself only from a "vote or decision" in exercising the "election
and option" ... "as provided for in Section 3. 2".

It did not

waive or relinquish its contract right to the "election and
option" or to participate in the resulting royalties whether the
option were exercised or not.

By withdrawing its prior election

under paragraph 3.2 and by agreeing never to so elect again in
the future, the Audreys effectively removed the election provision
from the Amended Audrey Lease and diminished the amount of royalty
that Rio could expect to receive as a Lessor thereunder, all
without the consent of Rio as a co-lessor and co-tenant of the
Audreys.
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The Jimco and Audrey Respondents take the position, and continually restate it throughout their briefs, that through paragraph
21.3 Rio not only excluded itself from participating in the "vote
or decision" with regard to the making of the election or exercising the option, but also that it waived all contract and property
rights with respect thereto.

Hence, the Audreys and Jimcos could

effectively remove the "election and option" language from the
lease without violating Rio's contract or co-tenancy rights.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INESCAPABLE EFFECT OF THE "SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT" IS
TO CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE "AMENDED AUDREY LEASE" BY
DELETING THE "ELECTION AND OPTION" PROVISIONS
OF PARAGRAPH 3.2
The factual setting which precipitated the litigation from
which this appeal is taken is accurately stated at page 19 of the
responding brief of the Audreys as follows:
By the very nature of the contractual relationship which Rio, one of the world's great
mining empires, entered into voluntarily, it
was theoretically possible that if the fair
market price of raw ore suddenly soared, and
Rio had contractually bound itself to sell
all of its concentrate for a fixed price
which did not allow for such an incredible
fair market value increase, it could find
itself to have made a very bad bargain. This
is indeed what happened in the uranium market.
Fortunately for the Audrey Defendants, they
had reserved the right to compute their
royalty on either the actual sales price, or
if this did not reflect market value, at the
actual fair market value of crude ore, if
they so chose.
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The Audrey Defendants so chose, thereby
causing financial pain to both Rio and the
Jimco Defendants.
Hence, it became apparent to the Audreys that, because of
the long-term purchase contract, and the rapidly escalating
market price, a peculiar set of circumstances had arisen wherein
the actual fair market value of the underlying ore was greater
than the long-term contract sales price received by Rio from
Rio's purchaser.

Thus, the Audreys determined that they could

substantially increase their cash flow from the lease by exercising the option set forth in paragraph 3.2 which is quoted above.
Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 21.3, Rio could not, and
did not, participate in that election.

However, the availability

of the election was a fundamental part of Rio's Amended Audrey
Lease agreement and it was, and is, entitled to participate
equally with the Audreys in the royalty payments pursuant to
their underlying property interests as recognized and stated in
the Amended Audrey Lease.

The effect of this election, had it

not been withdrawn, was:
l.

The Audrey-Rio share of royalties paid under the Amended

Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement would have been
increased and Rio would have participated to the extent of onefourth, or 25%, of that increase.
2.

The amount of such royalties to be paid to the Jimco

Group would have decreased.
When Jimco and Audrey reached impasse as to the mechanics of
computing the royalty on the 3.2 election basis, Rio instituted
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the action below as a declaratory judgment action in the nature
of an interpleader seeking guidance from the court as to how its
royalty payments should be divided under the provisions of the
Amended Audrey Lease and the Rio-Jimco Option Agreement.
Rather than face that determination, the Audreys and the
Jimcos got together, without the participation of Rio, and agreed:
1.

Audrey would rescind the election which would have

caused an increase in cash payments to itself and to Rio as
lessors and would agree perspectively never to exercise that
option in the future.
2.

In consideration therefor, Jimco agreed, rather than to

face substantial diminution of its cash flow, and possibly its
elimination entirely, to pay privately to Audrey a sum equal to
2.5% of the proceeds received from the sale of yellowcake.
Hence, through the so-called "Settlement Agreement" Rio's
cash flow as lessor under the terms of the Amended Audrey lease
was diminished and the cash flow to the Audreys was correspondingly increased, all without Rio's participation or consent.
Significantly, the Audreys and Jimcos did not offer to permit Rio
to participate as a tenant in common in the 2.5% override.

That

was paid by the Jimcos solely to the Audreys to protect what
otherwise was feared to be a severe, and possibly devastating,
reduction in cash flow because of the election theretofore made
by the Audreys.

It would be hard to imagine a clearer case of unilateral and
material changes in the Amended Audrey Lease.

Such changes,
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effected by the Jimcos and the Audreys through the "Settlement
Agreement" without the consent of Rio, brings into play each of
the doctrines and principles which are set forth in Rio's opening
brief.

It unquestioningly follows that the order here appealed

from is in error and should be set aside.

POINT II
THE AUDREYS AND JIMCOS HAVE NO RIGHT TO CHANGE THE
TERMS OF THE "AMENDED AUDREY LEASE" WITHOUT
RIO'S PARTICIPATION
As is shown above, the effect of the "Settlement Agreement",
to which Rio is not a party, is to delete from the Amended Audrey
Lease the election and option provisions of paragraph 3.2.
Respondents' position, as stated in their briefs, is that by
accepting the provisions of paragraph 21.3, Rio waived all rights
under paragraph 3.2.

Thus, Rio was not injured when the Jimcos

and the Audreys joined forces to eliminate paragraph 3.2 from the
agreement.

Respondents argue that: (1) the Audreys, under para-

graph 21.3 could elect the yellowcake royalty provisions of
paragraph 3.2, without voting participation by Rio, and (2)
under that option, Rio, as a lessor-co-tenant, would receive the
same amount of royalty as results under the terms of the "Settlement Agreement"; Ergo, Rio has not been injured and the fact that
Rio's co-tenants are given substantial additional royalty payments
is of no legitimate concern to Rio.

These arguments are falla-

cious.
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The "election and option" set forth in paragraph 3.2 is not
the exclusive right of the Audreys.

Paragraph 3.2 provides that

the "Lessors" shall "have the election and option".

It is con-

ceded by all that Rio is one of the Lessors under the provisions
of the Amended Audrey Lease.

It follows that Rio has election

and option rights.
The fact that paragraph 21.3 excludes Rio as a lessor whose
vote is necessary to exercise the option does not in any way rob
or deprive Rio of its substantive rights set forth in paragraph
3.2.

Rio's rights with respect to the "election and option",

which are vital parts of the Amended Audrey Lease, are analogous
to the property interests of the owner of non-voting corporate
stock.

By acquiring "non-voting" stock, it became "excluded"

from exercising voting rights, but retained its property interests
in the stock.

Likewise, here, Rio negotiated and signed the

Amended Audrey Lease which contained valuable option rights
conferred upon Rio and the Audreys as lessors.

The "exclusion"

of Rio's voting rights regarding the exercise of that option, as
provided in paragraph 21.3, certainly did not strip Rio of its
option rights as lessor, as specifically stated in paragraph 3.2.
At page 19 of .the Audrey responsive brief, the Audreys
stress the importance of paragraph 3.2 under the "incredible"
market situation which has developed by stating:
Fortunately for the Audrey Defendants, they
had reserved the right to compute their
royalty on either the actual sales price, or
if this did not reflect market value, at the
actual fair market value of crude ore, if
they so chose.
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In fact, they did so choose.

Rio, as one of the lessors,

then became entitled to have the "lessors" royalties computed on
that basis.

That right was forever abolished unilaterally by the

Audreys when they contractually obligated themselves to the
Jimcos never to exercise the paragraph 3.2 "election and option"
in exchange for very substantial consideration not shared by Rio,
their fellow co-tenant and lessor.
This action on the part of the Audreys effectively destroyed
the specifically stated "election and option" rights of the
lessors.

By so acting without the consent of all lessors, the

Audreys clearly violated Rio's rights as a lessor under the terms
of the Lease.

Rio concurs with the suggestion at page 19 of the

Audrey brief that the lessors were fortunate to have reserved to
themselves the very important "election and option" rights.

With

inflationary and speculative pressures continuing to push metal
values "through the roof", this right becomes more valuable with
every passing year.

The Audreys were not entitled to sell that

valuable right without the consent of all lessors, including Rio.
This is particularly true, as here, where the Audreys pocketed
the entire purchase price for themselves.
Thus, the election and option rights of paragraph 3.2 of the
Amended Audrey Lease are rights belonging to all lessors, including Rio and as set out in Rio's initial brief, the Audreys may
not sell those rights without Rio's participation.

To say other-

wise sanctions a breach of duties owed by the Audreys to Rio.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

It should be noted that the "Settlement Agreement" through
which this violation of Rio's rights as lessor was accomplished
by the Audreys was conditioned specifically upon court approval
and upon the substantive provisions of the order which is the
subject of this appeal.

Rio submits that this implementing order

is erroneous for the numerous reasons set forth in its opening
brief.

It follows that said order should be reversed and set

aside and this cause should be remanded for appropriate proceedings before the court below.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S SUMMARY APPROVAL OF THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS IMPROPER
In their responding briefs, both the Jimcos and the Audreys
cite numerous cases for the general proposition that the settlement of litigation is favored by the courts and that settlement
agreements should be enforced where possible.

We assume this

argument was made with tongue in cheek because:
1.

The Plaintiff below and the Appellant here, Rio, was

not a party to the "Settlement Agreement", and
2.

A necessary element of the "Settlement Agreement" was

to dismiss Rio's complaint against the Audreys (over Rio's objection), but to leave standing counterclaims asserted by the Jimcos
against Rio.
As set forth in Rio's opening brief, there are a plethora of
fact issues involving the Settlement Agreement, its negotiation,
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and its impact upon the various agreements at issue in this
litigation.

Rio submits that the existence of these fact ques-

tions would have made the "Settlement Agreement" here at issue an
improper subject of summary approval and implementation by the
trial court even if Rio had been a party to that settlement
agreement, which certainly is not true in this case.

This court

recently treated this subject in Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co.
v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605 (Utah 1979).

In that case, where

all parties to the litigation were parties to the settlement
agreement, this Court cited and quoted with approval from Autera
v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197 (D.C. cir. 1969) wherein that court
stated that summary enforcement of settlement agreements should
be made "only to the extent that full and fair opportunities to
prove one's point are substantially preserved." 419 F.2d at 1203.
Rio respectfully submits that under this doctrine, the order here
appealed from is erroneous and should be set aside.

CONLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as well as those set out in
Rio's initial brief, the "Settlement Agreement" between the
Audrey and Jimco Defendants must be rejected and the approval by
the trial court of that agreement reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~t6 day of October, 1979.
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of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
On this

sr{

day of October, 1979, I hereby certify that I

caused to be hand-delivered two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to:
Fabian & Clendenin
Attorneys for the AUDREY Defendants-Respondents
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Clinton D. Vernon
Attorney for the JIMCO Defendants-Respondents
415 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
Attorneys for the JIMCO Defendants-Respondents
141 East lst South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

